Sebastian Edwards tem uma interessante resenha que mostra evidências de que as boas reformas dos anos 90, na América Latina falharam por algum motivo que merece estudo. Destaque também para a verdadeira – e, devo dizer, pouco conhecida – definição de Consenso de Washington que não tem nada a ver com as psicodélicas teses simiescas que imaginam que o Consenso veio “de fora”, “imposto” aos “autóctones” (diga-se de passagem, se você é favor da auto-determinação dos povos, tem que aceitar o novo acordo de Uribe).

Deixando de lado a obviedade lógica que alguns diplomatas e presidentes não entendem, vamos ao trecho do texto que acho interessante (é bem no final):

Moreover, in a number of countries privatization was surrounded by corruption and giveaways, where insiders – including government functionaries in charge of the public enterprises and of the sales’ process – ended up buying large blocs of shares at conveniently low prices. At the same time, most countries failed to – or were unwilling to – move forward in the creation of strong and modern institutions that would encourage the rule of law, protect property rights and reduce the extent of corruption. Although these three areas – competitive exchange rates, competition policies, and protecting property rights through institutional reforms –, were part of the original Washington Consensus Decalogue, most countries paid only lip service to them. As a result and as the years passed, most countries were unable to move to the higher phases of the growth transitions, and became increasingly vulnerable to changes in global economic conditions. During the second half of the 1990s and early 2000s many of them succumbed to deep and costly currency crises that increased unemployment, wiped out savings, reduced wages, and generated disappointment and anger. In many countries these crises also paved the way to a new crop of populist governments that rejected globalization and were skeptical of the merits of market orientation.

Boas perguntas a serem investigadas. A selva latino-americana tem algum anticorpo contra reformas institucionais? Esta pergunta, para mim, é uma das principais e que não está, ainda, suficientemente estudada.

Moreover, in a number of countries privatization was
surrounded by corruption and giveaways, where insiders – including government
functionaries in charge of the public enterprises and of the sales’ process – ended up
buying large blocs of shares at conveniently low prices.36 At the same time, most
countries failed to – or were unwilling to – move forward in the creation of strong and
modern institutions that would encourage the rule of law, protect property rights and
reduce the extent of corruption. Although these three areas – competitive exchange rates,
competition policies, and protecting property rights through institutional reforms –, were
part of the original Washington Consensus Decalogue, most countries paid only lip
service to them. As a result and as the years passed, most countries were unable to move
to the higher phases of the growth transitions, and became increasingly vulnerable to
changes in global economic conditions. During the second half of the 1990s and early
2000s many of them succumbed to deep and costly currency crises that increased
unemployment, wiped out savings, reduced wages, and generated disappointment and
anger. In many countries these crises also paved the way to a new crop of populist
governments that rejected globalization and were skeptical of the merits of market
orientation.